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Foreign Bribes and the Securities Acts' Disclosure Require-
ments 
The Securities Act of 19331 and the Securities Exchange Act of 
19342 require most major corporations to disclose to investors all 
material3 information concerning company operations.4 Although 
they were not intended to regulate the conduct of business, n these 
disclosure obligations can have a deterrent effect upon improper 
corporate activities. 0 The recent revelation that a significant number 
of corporations have been making bribes and similar payments 
abroad7 has created interest in the feasibility of employing the disclo-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (1970). 
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to 78hh-1 (1970). 
3. See text at notes 16-31 infra. 
4. See Securities Act of 1933 §§ 7, 10, Schedule A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j, 77aa 
(1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(b), 13, 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(b), 
78m, 78n(a) (1970). 
5. Both of the acts were adopted shortly after the stock market crash of 1929. 
Analyses of the causes of that disaster indicated that half of the securities issued sub-
sequent to World War I had proven to be worthless-a loss to investors of some 25 
billion dollars. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933 ). This speculation 
in worthless or overpriced securities to the disadvantage of the average, uninformed 
investor was the principal factor that led President Franklin D. Roosevelt to request 
the passage of national securities laws. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-
2 (1934). Thus, one of the significant evils that Congress set out to rectify was the 
absence of adequate information in the securities markets upon which the investing 
public could reliably base its investment decisions. The express purpose of the Se-
curities Act of 1933 was "that there should be full disclosure of every essentially im-
portant element attending the issue of a new security." H.R. REP. No. 85, supra, at 
3. Similarly, a principal purpose of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 was to cope 
with "the secrecy surrounding the financial conditions of corporations which invite 
the public to purchase their securities." S. REP. No. 792, supra, at 5. The deterrent 
effect of public exposure of information was clearly recognized when the acts were 
·adopted: "The existence of bonuses, of excessive commissions and salaries, of prefer-
ential lists and the like, may all be open secrets among the knowing, but the knowing 
are few. There is a shrinking quality to such transactions; to force knowledge of 
them into the open is largely to restrain their happening." Frankfurter, The Federal 
Securities Act: II, FORTUNE, Aug. 1933, at 55. Congress, however, expressly denied 
that the acts resulted from any purpose on the part of Congress to regulate the con-
duct of business: "Nor is its purpose or effect to regiment business in any way." 
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934); "The principal objection di-
rected against the provisions for corporate reporting is that they constitute a veiled 
attempt to invest a governmental commission with the power to interfere in the man-
agement of corporations. The committee has no such intention •... " S. REP. No. 
192, supra, at 10. 
6. See Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607, 
614 (1964); Mundheim, Selected Trends in Disclosure Requirements for Public Cor-
porations, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 3, 4 (1975). 
1. See, e.g., How Clean Is Business?, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1975, at 50. It does 
not seem that such practices are isolated instances of corporate indiscretion. A sig-
nificant number of corporations are under Internal Revenue Service investigation for 
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sure requirements to curtail this practice. 8 This Note will show that, 
despite recent pressures for change, 9 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission has continued to view its disclosure requirement as 
applying primarily to material information of financial, rather than of 
social or political, concern to investors.10 Improper payments in 
foreign countries can, under certain factual conditions, be found 
material in this traditional sense through ad hoc adjudication. The 
Note will then demonstrate the difficulty of delineating new tests for 
materiality that could be made specifically applicable to all improper 
payments abroad. It will further argue that, even if payments can be 
brought within the scope of disclosure requirements, 11 the deterrent 
effect would be insufficient to curb objectionable conduct. The Note 
concludes that reliance upon the securities laws to control improper 
corporate conduct abroad is thus inferior to ·the direct sanctions 
normally used by society to prevent antisocial behavior and may, in 
fact, undermine the traditional purposes of federal securities legisla-
tion. 
In the federal securities laws, Congress enumerated certain finan-
cial and factual information that the SEC could require corporations 
to disclose through registration and periodic reporting. 12 The SEC 
was also granted the broad authority13 to make rules "necessary or 
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."14 
allegedly improper domestic and foreign payments. See Wall St. J., July 18, 1975, 
at 4, col. 1 (midwest ed.). By March 1976, approximately 80 companies had dis-
closed to the Securities and Exchange Commission that they had made improper pay-
ments. Wall St. J., March 16, 1976, at 28, col. 4 (midwest ed.). 
8. See, e.g., Address by R. Garrett, Jr., Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., Homily on the Glories 
of Right Conduct and the Wages of Sin, June 27, 1975 [hereinafter Garrett]; NEWS-
WEEK, supra note 7. Congress has also begun to consider the feasibility of curtailing 
such conduct. See S. 3133, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); S. 3379, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1976); text at notes 132, 133 infra. 
9. Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 
(D.D.C. 1974). 
10. The efforts of the SEC with respect to improper corporate expenditures 
abroad have focused primarily on large payments intended to have a significant im-
pact upon the company's foreign business. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 7; Wall St. 
J., Sept. 9, 1975, at 1, col. 6 and at 11, col. 1-2 (midwest ed.). 
11. Some payments have been in excess of 100 million dollars. NEWSWEEK, 
supra note 7, at 50. There seems to be little disagreement that payments of such 
magnitude must be disclosed. See generally Garrett, supra note 8; Wall St. J., Sept. 
9, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (midwest ed.). 
12. See note 4 supra. 
13. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 § 12(b)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 78/(b)(l) (1970). 
14. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77j, 781, 78n (1970). See also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s, 78w 
(1970). Somewhat different language was employed with respect to section 13(a) 
of the Securities Exchange Act. This section confers the power to require any in-
formation in periodic reports necessary to keep the registration information current 
"as necessary or appropriate for the proper protection of investors and to insure fair 
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While this appears to be a virtually unrestricted mandate for the 
exercise of its rulemaking power, in practice the SEC has followed an 
implicit statutory requirement that only "material" facts need be 
disclosed.15 Whether improper foreign payments fall under the dis-
closure requirement turns largely on SEC and judicial constructions 
of "materiality." 
The term "material" is not defined in either of the securities acts. 
The legislative history indicates that the primary congressional aim 
was to elicit financially significant information16 crucial to proper 
valuation of publicly offered securities,17 the type of disclosure that 
dealing in the security." 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970). The purpose of the section 13 
periodic reporting requirements is to keep the information filed under the registration 
requirements of section 12 up to date. As such, the rule-making authority derived 
from section 13 was probably not intended to differ in character from that of section 
12. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 5, at 23. 
15. In order to ensure compliance with the disclosure sections of the statutes and 
with the Commission's regulations, Congress imposed liabilities and sanctions for the 
nondisclosure or misrepresentation of material corporate information within required 
statements under the acts: "In case . . . the registration statement . . . contained 
an untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact . . . any 
person acquiring such security ... may ..• sue ...• " 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) 
( 1970); "Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement . . . filed 
pursuant to this chapter . . . which statement was at the time and in the light of 
the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with respect to any 
material fact, shall be liable .... " 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1970). From this limitation 
on liability it may be inferred that the Commission is limited in its rulemaking au-
thority to requirements of disclosure of material information. This inference is sup-
ported by language used in the discussion of hoped for effects of the acts: "There 
cannot be honest markets without honest publicity. . • . The disclosure of informa-
tion materially important to investors may not instantaneously be reflected in market 
value, but despite the intricacies of securities values truth does find relatively quick 
acceptance of the market." H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 5, at 11. Further sup-
port can be found in the fact that Congress has seemingly acquiesed in interpretations 
made by the SEC that it is limited to requiring the disclosure of material information. 
See generally Fmsr ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SECURIIlES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1935, at 2 (1935). 
Although certain of the statutes employ the phrase "public interest," see text at 
note 14 supra, use of this language apparently does not expand the SEC's power to 
require disclosure beyond that which is material for the protection of the investor. 
While such language is frequently employed in national legislation, see, e.g., Federal 
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1970); Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (1970), it is not given an expansive construction by 
the courts. See, e.g., NAACP v. Federal Power Commn., 520 F.2d 432, 441 (D.C. 
Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 890 (1975). In construing the "public interest" lan-
guage of section 6(b) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-
25, the court observed that " '[w]ords like "public interest" . . . take their mraning 
and definition from the substantive provisions and purposes of the Act.'" Alaoama 
Elec. Coop. v. SEC, 353 F.2d 905, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 968 
(1966). The "public interest" language of the securities acts therefore should not 
be given a meaning broader than concern for the informational needs of investors, 
since it was to meet that need that the laws were adopted. . 
16. See Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under the Federal Securities Regula-
tions, 16 Bus. I.Aw. 300, 305-06, 320 (1961). 
17. In reference to the Securities Exchange Act, Congress observed: 
No investor, no speculator, can safely buy and sell securities upon the exchanges 
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would be "demanded by competent bankers from their borrowers. 
"
18 Still, there are indications that Congress recognized that 
other matters might be important to an investor and that "materiality" 
might encompass more than narrow financial concerns. This is 
reflected in the Senate's view of what the provisions of the Exchange 
Act governing proxies19 were to provide: "In order that the stock-
holder may have adequate knowledge as to the manner in which his 
interests are being served, it is essential that he be enlightened not 
only as to the financial condition of the corporation, but also as to the 
major questions of policy, which are decided at stockholders' meet-
ings."20 The passage can be interpreted as express congressional 
recognition that a stockholder's concerns as an owner about the 
activities of his corporation may be very broad. An example is the 
interest of the stockholder in the integrity and ability of directorial 
candidates. 21 This construction of the proxy provisions certainly 
illuminates congressional understanding of "materiality" as used in 
the registration and reporting contexts. Some commentators have 
concluded that the language of the securities acts encompasses vir-
tually any information of potential importance to investors, regardless 
of its nature or quality.22 
In accord with the traditional approach of the judiciary toward 
corporate disclosure, the Supreme Court has recently taken an expan-
without having an intelligent basis for forming his judgment as to the value of 
the securities he buys or sells. The idea of a free and open public market is builL 
upon the theory that competing judgments of buyers and sellers as to the fair 
price of a security brings about a situation where the market price reflects as 
nearly as possible a just price. [T]he hiding and secreting of important infor-
mation obstructs the operation of the markets as indices of real value. 
H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 5, at 11. 
Similarly, in describing the character of the information to be disclosed under the 
Securities Act, Congress said it was "indispensable to any accurate judgment upon the 
value of the security." H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 5, at 3. 
18. H.R. REP. No. 85, supra note 5, at 4. 
19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14a, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970). 
20. S. REP. No. 792, supra note 5, at 12. "Insiders have at times solicited proxies 
without fairly informing the stockholders of the purposes for which the proxies are 
to be used and have used such proxies to take from the stockholders for their own 
selfish advantage valuable property rights." H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 5, at 
13-14. 
21. See generally SEC Securities Act Release No. 5466, Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 10,673 (March 8, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 10237 (1974) (the conviction 
or indictment of corporate officers for violations of the federal campaign contribu-
tions laws must be reported in SEC filings because such convictions raise questions 
concerning the integrity of corporate management and as such are important to in-
vestors); SEC Report on Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices 
[hereinafter SEC Report on Questionable Practices], CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. No. 
642, Part II, at 30-31 (May 19, 1976) ("Investors have a right under the federal se-
curities laws to be fully advised of facts concerning character and integrity of the 
officials relevant to their management of the corporation ... "). 
22. See Cohen, "Truth in Securities'' Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1340, 1368 
(1966); Mundheim, supra note 6, at 31. 
1226 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1222 
sive view of the statutory materiality concept. In Mills v. Electric 
Auto-Lite Co., 23 corporate directors urging approval of a merger with 
another corporation omitted from a proxy statement the fact that they 
were nominees of that other corporation. Holding this omission to be 
material, the Court said that it was of "such a character that it might 
have been considered important by a reasonable shareholder. 
" 24 Similarly, the Court in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United 
States25 held that it had been a material omission for persons who 
bought securities from the plaintiffs not to reveal that the securities 
were being purchased for resale. The Court observed that "[a]ll that 
is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in the sense that a 
reasonable investor might have considered them important in the 
making of this decision."26 While it is arguable that a recent Su-
preme Court decision may now have narrowed the definition of ma-
teriality, the broad concept articulated in Mills and Affiliated Ute has 
been recognized by lower courts. 27 
In all these cases, the courts made determinations of materiality in 
specific fact situations. It is the role of the SEC, through its rule-mak-
ing power, to delineate categories of information that are material in 
recurring corporate contexts and that must therefore be routinely 
disclosed.28 A Commission disclosure rule could be rejected under 
the Administrative Procedure Act29 only if a court found it to be 
"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law."30 No cases of judicial invalidation of an SEC 
interpretation of materiality have been found. Thus, the already 
expansive formulations of materiality upheld by the courts may reveal 
only a minimum level that could easily be broadened further through 
SEC rule-making. 31 This is support for the proposition that the 
23. 396 U.S. 375 (1970). 
24. 396 U.S. at 384 (emphasis added). 
25. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
26. 406 U.S. at 153-54 (emphasis added). 
27. The recent decision is TSC Indus. Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 44 U.S.L.W. 4852 
(U.S. June 14, 1976) (No. 74-1471). For cases that followed Mills and Affiliated 
Ute, see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 
695 (D.D.C. 1974); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 
569 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). Contra, Ash v. Baker, 392 F. Supp. 368, 371-72 (E.D. Pa,, 
1975). 
28. "[The securities] statutes grant the SEC broad rulemaking authority. The 
language of the acts suggests that the SEC is empowered to exercise its informed dis-
cretion about which information will be required to be disclosed in the various corpo-
rate filings." Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 
695 (D.D.C. 1974). 
29. 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1970). 
30. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970). 
31. The reviewing court's decision would not properly be based upon its own, 
perhaps more limited, notion of materiality; "the court [will exercise] restraint and [af-
firm] the agency's action even though the court would on its own account have made 
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Commission has the authority to require routine disclosure of the 
improper expenditure of corporate funds in foreign countries, regard-
less of whether the amount involved was financially significant to the 
company or the investor.32 
In operating under its broad enabling act mandate, the SEC has 
adopted procedures and rules that, if read literally, would compel 
disclosure of any questionable foreign payment. All moderate-sized 
corporations33 and most corporations, irrespective of size, that seek 
investors' funds through a public offering, 34 must file one or more 
forms with the SEC. 35 The disclosure requirements of three of 
them36 embrace a concept of materiality potentially applicable to 
foreign payments. 
First, each form requires that, "if the registrant and its subsidi-
aries engage in material operations in foreign countries, or if a 
material portion of sales or revenues is derived from customers in 
foreign countries, appropriate disclosure shall be made with respect to 
different findings or adopted different standards." Greater Boston Television Corp. 
v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971). 
32. The SEC objects that the provision of S. 3133, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), 
requiring disclosure of any expenditure that exceeds 1000 dollars would deny the 
Commission needed flexibility. SEC Report on Questionable Practices, supra note 
21, at 60. Yet · 
[t]he Commission is also of the view that questionable or illegal payments, if 
unknown to the board of directors, could be grounds for disclosure regardless of 
the size of the payment itself or its impact on dependent business because the 
fact that corporate officials have been willing to make repeated illegal payments 
without broad knowledge and without proper accounting raises questions regard-
ing improper exercise to corporate authority and may also be a circumstance rele-
vant to the "quality of management" that should be disclosed to the sharehold-
ers. 
Id. at 15. 
33. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(g)(l)(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(g)(l) 
(1970). 
34. See Securities Act of 1933 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1970). 
35. The Commission has adopted a variety of specialized reporting forms that a 
corporation must submit in order to register securities under either of the acts or 
to comply with the periodic reporting requirements of section 13 of the Securities Ex-
change Act. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 239.4 to 239.61, 249.208a to 249.450 (1975). The 
basic forms include: Form S-1 to be employed in registration under the Securities 
Act, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1975); Form 10 to be employed under the registration re-
quirements of section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 249.210 
( 197 5) ; and Form 1 OK to be employed under the annual reporting provisions of sec-
tion 13 of the Securities Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1975). These forms 
require disclosures that, in the proper circumstances, could apply to improper foreign 
payments, including demands for the following information: on the use of antici-
pated proceeds from the sale of a new security issue, Item 3 of Form S-1, 2 CCH 
FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 7123, at 6203 (1974), on pending legal proceedings against the 
corporation of a material nature, Item 12 of Form S-1, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 
11 7123, at 6211-13 (1976), and Item 5 of Form lOK, 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 
11 31,103, at 22,057 (1976), and on past and pending criminal actions against a 
director or executive officer, Item 16 of Form S-1, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 117123, 
at 6214 (1974). 
36. Form S-1, 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (1975); Form 10, 17 C.F.R. § 249.210 (1975); 
Form lOK, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (1975). 
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the importance of that business to the registrant and the risks attend-
ant thereto."37 The disclosure of special risks may be appropriate 
where favorable treatment in a foreign nation is dependent upon 
improper payments, since discovery of such practices could lead to 
serious repercussions for the company. 38 Second, each requires a 
financial statement,39 the deliberate falsification of which is a viola-
tion of the securities laws. 40 A clear example of deliberate falsity 
would be the operation of a secret "slush fund" by the corporation: 
"Phony book entries and unaccounted for funds are wholly inconsist-
ent with financial integrity. When they are deliberately produced by 
the conscious policy of top management, or its benign neglect, the 
problem is serious and investors ought to know about it."41 Even if 
it includes disbursements in the accounting statements, management 
37. Item 9 of Form S-1, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 7123, at 6211 (1974); 
Item 1 of Form 10, 3 CCH FED. SEC, L. REP. 11 27,303, at 21,306 (1976); Item 1 
of Form lOK, 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 31,103, at 22,055 (1976). Another form 
provision that may have application requires, "If a material part of the business is 
dependent upon a single customer or a few customers, the loss of any one or more 
of whom would have a materially adverse effect on the business of the registrant, 
the name of the customer or customers, their relationship, if any, to the registrant 
and material facts regarding their importance to the business of the registrant [must be 
reported]." Item 9 of Form S-1, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 7123, at 6207 (1974); 
Item 1 of Form 10, 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 27,303, at 21,302 (1976); Item 1 
of Form lOK, 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 31,102 at 22,053 (1976). Depending on 
the definition given to the word "material," it appears that a company doing a large 
volume of business with a foreign country would be required to divulge conditions 
critical to that business, e.g., kickback agreements with foreign officials. 
38. The discovery of such conduct in foreign countries has had diverse conse-
quences. The Japanese government, for example, indicated that it would exclude the 
Lockheed Corporation from consideration as a contractor on a one-billion-dollar anti-
submarine patrol aircraft project. Detroit News, Feb. 15, 1976, at 1-A, cols. 2-3, 
Disclosure of bribes to government officials in Honduras led to demands for national-
ization of the wrongdoing corporation's assets and was shortly followed by the over-
throw of the country's president, a suspected recipient of the bribe. Wall St. J., May 
15, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (midwest ed.). According to one analysis, "[P]ublic knowledge 
that a company is making such illegal payments, even of a minor nature in one for-
eign country could cause not only expropriation of assets in that country but also 
a similar reaction or a discontinuation of material amounts of business in other coun-
tries as well." SEC Report on Questionable Practices, supra note 21, at 15. 
39. Item 21 of Form S-1, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 7123, at 6218 (1974); 
Item 18 of Form 10, 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1127,303, at 21,317 (1976); Item 10 
of Form lOK, 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 31,103, at 22,060 (1976). 
40. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1975). For this rule to apply to corporate misstate-
ments, it is nQt necessary that the corporation itself be directly involved in the sales 
transaction. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), 
See also Garrett, supra note 8, at 21-22. 
The SEC has concluded that "the existence of inaccurate records has . • . often 
provided an· independent basis for requiring some form of disclosure or the initiation 
of Commission enforcement action, regardless of whether the payments themselves 
were of material size or a material amount of business depended on their continua-
tion." SEC Report on Questionable Practices, supra note 21, at 13. The SEC, how-
ever, has suggested, in draft legislation proposed by the Commission, that the effect 
of such falsifications be made even clearer. Id. at 64. 
41. Garrett, supra note 8, at 22. See also note 40 supra, 
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may attempt to hide transactions through the use of "euphemistically 
titled account[s]."42 However, Regulation S-X, the Commission's 
accounting rules, 43 contains a "catch-all" requirement for disclosure 
in those situations that cannot be anticipated or enumerated in the 
general accounting specifications but in which disclosure is "neces-
sary to make the required statements, in light of the circumstances 
under which they are made, not misleading."44 The registration and 
reporting forms are supplemented by SEC rules that require disclo-
sure of "material information . . . necessary" to avoid the making of 
misleading statements45 and by comparable proxy solicitation rules. 46 
In deciding their applicability to foreign payments, these forms 
and rules on disclosure must be considered in the context of the SEC's 
definition of materiality: "The term 'material,' when used to qualify 
a requirement for the furnishing of information as to any subject, 
limits the information required to those matters as to which an 
average prudent investor ought reasonably to be informed before 
buying or selling the security registered."47 Although it is no easy 
task to ascertain the needs of the average investor, it can be said ·that 
the SEC is disposed to define them in terms of economic significance. 
This is demonstrated by Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 
v. SEC,48 in which plaintiffs sought disclosure of environmental 
impact analyses of corporate activities and of specific statistics on 
42. Garrett, supra note 8, at 22. 
43. 17 C.F.R. § 210.1-01 (1975). 
44. 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-06 (1975). Even if the placement of these payments un-
der an accounting title such as "miscellaneous operating expenses" were to be found 
not to violate Reg. S-X, disclosure would not necessarily be excused under other re-
quirements. See text at notes 45-46 infra. 
45. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.408 (promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933), 
240.12b-20 (promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) (1975). Fair 
disclosure is, in fact, a requirement in any statement by the corporation, including 
communications made outside of the SEC reporting system. Rule lOb-5, promulgated 
under the Securities Exchange Act to prevent deceptive practices in all situations in-
volving security transfers, makes it unlawful for any person to omit a material fact 
from any statement that would have the result of misleading investors in connection 
with a security transaction. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 
90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), rehearinig denied, 404 U.S. 1064 
(1972) (liability imposed upon the corporation for misstatements contained in a 
press release). 
46. See 11 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1975) ("No solicitation subject to this regulation 
shall be made by means of any proxy statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting 
or other communication, written or oral, containing any statement which at the time 
and in the light of the circumstances under which it is made, is false or misleading 
with respect to any material fact, or which omits to state any material fact neces-
sary in order to make the statement therein not false or misleading ... "). 
47. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2(j) (1975). The rule promulgated under the Securities 
Act is identical except that it applies only to those matters about which an "investor 
ought reasonably to be informed before purchasing the security registered." 17 
C.F.R. § 230.405(1) (1975). See text at notes 23-26 supra. 
48. 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974). 
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minority hiring.49 The district court held that a class of "ethical 
investors"50 had been improperly denied an opportunity for input 
during the SEC rulemaking process. 51 The court recognized that the 
plaintiffs might be primarily motivated by a concern for the environ-
ment but argued that their concern might "also proceed from the 
recognition that awareness of and sensitivity to environmental prob-
lems is the mark of intelligent management."52 The court was "not 
prepared to say that [ethical investors] are not rational investors and 
that the information they seek is not material information within the 
meaning of the securities laws."53 
Following remand, the Commission held extensive hearingsu4 "to 
obtain the views of the public concerning whether, and to what 
extent, information that does not necessarily have direct and immedi-
ate economic significance might nevertheless be the type of informa-
tion that a reasonable investor would wish to have in making an 
investment decision or giving a proxy."55 Consistent with the court, 
it found that even investors who advocated disclosure of matters of 
social significance were motivated by long-term economic concerns.116 
However, by identifying a category of "pure" social matters for which 
disclosure is unjustified, 57 the Commission appeared not to share the 
court's deference toward investor decisions made in accord with "high 
principles and societal interests."58 Thus, economic significance was 
49. 389 F. Supp. at 692. 
50. The court took notice of "individuals and institutions such as our great uni-
versities and foundations which have large funds to invest and need the information 
. . . to make investments and voting decisions in accordance with their high princi-
ples and societal interests." 389 F. Supp. at 693. See also J. SIMON, THE EnucAL 
INVESTOR (1972). 
51. 389 F. Supp. at 700 (the court remanded the issue to the SEC so that the 
plaintiffs could have an input into the Commission's final result). 
52. 389 F. Supp. at 700. 
53. 389 F. Supp. at 700. 
54. Securities Act Release No. 5627, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,733, 
[Current Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 80,310, at 85,706 (Oct. 14, 1975). 
55. Securities Act Release No. 5569, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,236, 
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 80,110, at 85,110 (Feb. 11, 
1975). 
56. The argument presented to the Commission was "that in the long run, corpo-
rate social responsibility determines the public relations and regulatory framework 
within which a company operates." Securities Act Release No. 5627, Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 11,733, supra note 54, at 85,724. It is likely that the com-
ments submitted were deliberately cast in economic terms because of the Commis-
sion's propensity to focus on matters relating to financial concerns when considering 
disclosure requirements. 
51. Id. at 85,713 ("[D]iscretion vested in the Commission under the Securities 
Act and the Securities and Exchange Act to require disclosure . . . does not generally 
permit the Commission to require disclosure for the sole purpose of promoting social 
goals unrelated to those underlying these Acts"). See also note 15 supra. 
58. See note 50 supra. 
The fairness of the Commission's procedures must be questioned. Although no-
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affirmed as the core of the SEC's understanding of materiality. 59 
This remains true, despite the Commission's recent departure in 
its policy requiring the disclosure of all indictments and convictions 
under the Federal Election Campaign Act. 60 The amount of money 
contributed and its purpose are evidently irrelevant to the duty to 
disclose. The Commission has obviously concluded that such infor-
mation is per se important to the average investor, even without 
evidence of its economic significance, for "a conviction is material to 
an evaluation of the integrity of the management of the corpora-
tion .... "61 
Although the conclusions reached by the Commission concerning 
the materiality of "pure" social matters and of illegal corporate cam-
paign contributions appear irreconcilable, the disparity can be under-
stood in terms of judicial manageability. Socially significant cor-
porate activities embrace a virtually infinite variety of conduct;62 de-
termining the standards of materiality would be an extremely difficult 
task63 that the Commission is understandably reluctant to undertake. 
This is not a problem in the case of indictments and convictions for 
illegal campaign contributions that have been specifically defined by 
Congress. 64 
tice of SEC hearings is published in the Federal Register, it is unlikely that many 
average investors would be aware of the opportunity to make their views known. 
Moreover, the Comi;nission based its decision to limit disclosure not on the find-
ing that social matters do not have a relation to the long-term financial well-being 
of a corporation, but rather upon the practical difficulties of disclosing social matters 
and the speculative conclusion that lines could not be drawn to distinguish various 
matters of social concern. The Commission felt that disclosure in one area would 
lead to disclosure in others--creating too great a burden on the system. See Securi-
ties Act Release No. 5627, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,733, supra note 
54. 
59. See Blumberg, The Public's "Right To Know"; Disclosure in the Major Ameri-
can Company, 28 Bus. LAw 1028 (1973). 
This commentator argues: 
Notwithstanding pressures from "public interest" groups, the Commission has 
thus far refused to expand its disclosure requirements to include matters pertain-
ing to social and environmental issues, except where the information would have 
a material effect on the financial condition of the corporation. The existence of 
widespread public interest in a public policy issue is not considered a relevant 
basis for compulsory disclosure if the public policy concern does not constitute a 
material element in investor evaluation of securities. 
Id. at 1038. 
60. Securities Act Release No. 5466, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,673, 
supra note 21. 
61. Id. 
62. In response to the Commission's request for investor interest in socially sig-
nificant matters, some 100 different interests were identified. Securities Act Release 
No. 5627, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,733, supra note 54, at 85,724 n.72. 
63. Id. at 85,724-25. 
64. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp. IV, 1974) ("It 
is unlawful for • • • any corporation whatever, or any labor organization to make a 
contribution or expenditure in connection with any election at which Presidential or 
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Improper corporate expenditures in foreign countries seem to bear 
a close resemblance to improper campaign contributions. Because 
there has thus far been no legislative finding that particular foreign 
payments are illegal under United States law,65 however, the prob-
lem of setting standards in this area is analogous to that of defining 
matters of general social concern. 66 The SEC has therefore relied 
principally upon traditional notions of financial significance in deter-
minations of the materiality of corporate expenditures abroad. This 
is evident in recent SEC actions against companies that have paid 
relatively large amounts of money to acquire significant contracts 
or concessions. 67 
Adoption of a financial perspective of materiality by no means 
dispenses with all uncertainty in its application to specific situations. 
In determining whether a particular payment was improper and ma-
terial, corporate managers must somehow weigh various factors: the 
identity of the persons making and receiving the payment; the amount 
Vice Presidential electors or a Senator or Representative • . . are to be voted for 
... "). 
65. A bill has been introduced that would make such payments illegal under 
United States law. S. 3133, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) reads in part: 
PAYMENTS TO OFFICIALS 
Sec. 30A. It shall be unlawful for any issuer of a security registered pursuant to 
section 12 to make use of the mails or of any means or instrumentality of inter-
state commerce to--
(1) offer, pay, or agree to pay any money or offer, give, or promise to give 
anything of value to an individual who is an official of a foreign government or 
instrumentality thereof for the purpose of inducing that individual to use his in-
fluence within such foreign government or instrumentality to obtain or maintain 
business for or with the issuer or to influence legislation or regulations of that 
government; 
(2) pay or agree to pay any money or give or agree to give any thing of 
value to any person knowing or having reason to know that all or a portion of 
such moneys or thing of value will be offered, given or promised directly or indi-
rectly to any individual who is an official of a foreign government or instru-
mentality thereof for the purpose of inducing that individual to use his influence 
within such foreign government or instrumentality to obtain or maintain business 
for or with the issuer or to influence legislation or regulations of that govern-
ment; 
(3) pay or agree to pay any money or give or agree to give any thing of 
value to any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for for-
eign political office for the purpose of inducing that party, official, or candidate 
to use its or his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof 
to obtain or maintain business for or with the issuer or to influence legislation or 
regulations of that government; or 
(4) pay or agree to pay any money or give or agree to give any thing of 
value in a manner or for a purpose which is illegal under the laws of a foreign 
government having jurisdiction over the transaction. 
66. The conduct involved can have widely varying characteristics and, because of 
the diverse laws and customs of the many countries involved, it is not possible to 
distill a single standard by which to judge the propriety of the conduct. See generally 
Garrett, supra note 8, at 17; NEWSWEEK, supra note 7, at 50. 
67. It is possible, of course, to argue that this result stems from a practical allo-
cation of resources to those situations representing the "worst" abuses of the dis-
closure system. For a highly useful summary of the actions taken by the SEC, see 
SEC Report on Questionable Practices, supra note 21, at B-1 to B-24. 
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of the payment; the method and correctness of accounting for the pay-
ment; the benefits expected to accrue to the corporation; the ethical 
code of the foreign country involved; and the potential reactions of 
the host country's government, its citizens, the corporate stockholders 
and the American public should the payment be discovered. 68 Given 
the absence of meaningful SEC standards69 for combining and weigh-
ing these factors and the financial motivation that normally exists to 
keep the payments secret, 70 corporate officials can generally be ex-
pected to strike the balance in favor of nondisclosure, 71 except in the 
most extreme situations of financial materiality. 72 
While the SEC has had some success with the current disclosure 
requirements, 73 the fact remains that the effectiveness of the system 
rests largely on good faith, voluntary compliance by corporations.74 
The flexibility of accounting techniques, 75 the scarcity of SEC re-
sources, 76 and the fact that the conduct in question takes place in 
distant countries combine to make the potential for successful avoid-
68. Garrett, supra note 8, at 21. More recently the SEC has suggested a similar 
list of relevant considerations, "including the accounting treatment accorded the pay-
ments in question; the amount of the payment and its legality under local law; the 
recipient of the payment and the purpose for which it is made; the knowledge or par-
ticipation by senior management; the frequency and pervasiveness of the payment 
practices; and whether the company has taken measures to terminate the activities." 
SEC Report 011 Questio11able Practices, supra note 21, at 17. 
69. The long-awaited guidelines contained in the SEC Report issued as this Note 
was being prepared for publication are of very little help. They tend to concentrate 
almost entirely on accounting procedures and requirements and do not give rules that 
would tell a businessman, or even his lawyer, that certain expenditures must be spe-
cifically disclosed, so long as they are properly entered on the books. See ge11erally 
SEC Report 011 Questio11able Practices, supra note 21. 
70. Potentially severe costs may flow from the disclosure of an improper foreign 
payment. See note 38 supra and accompanying text; text at notes 119-34 infra. 
11. But see Wall St. J., May 13, 1976, at 2, col. 3 (midwest ed.) ("By hedging 
its advice with extensive qualifications, moreover, the SEC made it unlikely that 
many companies will feel sufficiently confident to omit disclosure without first seek-
ing further commission advice"). The author of this Note does not believe that 
vagueness and uncertainty will lead to expanded disclosure. 
12. But see Wall St. J., Sept. 9, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (midwest ed.) ("SEC enforce-
ment officials bristle at [the claim that guidelines are necessary]. 'The only people 
who have any difficulty interpreting what we are trying to do are the lawyers' ..• "). 
73. At least 14 consent decrees have been entered, and approximately 100 com-
panies have admitted making questionable payments. SEC Report on Questionable 
Practices, supra note 21, at 54. 
14. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 7, at 50. "In the end, the agency can only hope 
that business plays fair. And despite the current furor over corporate malfeasance, 
neither the public nor the Congress seems to want a wholesale reformation of the 
system itself. What they do seek, however, is a business community that lives up 
to the letter and spirit of the law." Id. at 54 (emphasis in original). 
15. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 7. "For all their sense of regulatory fervor these 
days, SEC officials admit that as businesses intent on hiding something in their books 
learn to build better mousetraps, the investigator's job grows tougher." Id. at 54. 
16. See Garrett, supra note 8, at 19; SEC Report on Questionable Practices, supra 
note 21, at 43. 
1234 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 74:1222 
ance of disclosure obligations a significant concern. 77 Attention 
must therefore be focused on whether uncertainty can be eliminated 
and good faith compliance maximized by the framing of a clear 
standard for compelling disclosure in specific fact situations. It must 
then be asked whether SEC regulation of the payments through 
disclosure obligations is a desirable method to use if deterrence is the 
primary goal. 
At least two new approaches to clarifying requirements can be 
suggested:78 formulation of bright-line rules concerning size, method 
and purpose of payment as well as factors such as risk of disclosure 
to the company;79 or adoption of a materiality per se rule similar to 
that used in the illegal campaign contribution context. so An initial 
obstacle to developing bright-line rules is the difficulty of formulating 
definitive disclosure obligations that meet the informational needs of 
both the traditional and the "ethical" investor. While SEC Commis-
sioners have the expertise and experience to develop specific require-
ments concerning financial significance, 81 they have no special capac-
ity to decide which of many social issues should be given priority 
attention by investors.82 Nor do they possess unique qualifications to 
determine ethical standards for corporations and their employees. 83 
Moreover, any attempt by the SEC to integrate matters other than 
financial significance or actual illegality84 into a bright-line rule will 
11. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 7, at 54. 
78. A third approach, currently employed by the SEC, relies upon sanitizing the 
contents of a disclosure to minimize the corporate motivations for not disclosing 
in the first place. It suggests that "multinational corporations making payments 
abroad be required to disclose, generically, the existence of such a corporate practice, 
and perhaps, the extent to which it's engaged in, without specifically identifying who 
got what." Garrett, supra note 8, at 28. Such an approach is arguably a waste of 
effort, for it is possible that there will be neither a deterrent effect nor disclosure 
of information adequate for an investor to quantify the risk involved in the conduct. 
See SEC Report on Questionable Practices, supra note 21, at 32-33. 
19. See generally Garrett, supra note 8, at 26. 
80. See generally Garrett, supra note 8, at 20 ("As you can see, if we require 
disclosure of all violations of laws against bribery or political contributions on the 
ground that illegal payments are material per se, we may be hard pressed to explain 
that other illegal corporate acts are not equally material for the same reason") (em-
phasis in original). 
81. For example, Item 12 of Form S-1, employed for registrations under the Se-
curities Act, requires the description of material legal proceedings. In the instruc-
tions accompanying that form the Commission has indicated that disclosure is only re-
quired if the damages prayed for exceed ten per cent of current assets. 2 CCH FED. 
SEC. L. REP., 1f 7123, at 6211-13 (1976). 
82. In fact, the Commission has declined to choose from among various social 
issues as potential subjects of disclosure. See Securities Act Release No. 5627, Secur-
ities Exchange Act Release No. 11,733, supra note 54, at 85,724-25. 
83. See generally Garrett, supra note 8. 
84. The Commission could clearly rely on actual indictments or convictions as 
it has in the area of corporate campaign contributions. See text at note 60 supra; 
note 69 supra and accompanying text. 
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undoubtedly produce challenges from public interest and corporate 
representatives objecting to the rules as being arbitrarily under- or 
over-inclusive. 85 
Even if financial significance is the exclusive test for disclosure, it 
remains a formidable task to articulate definite rules for considering 
the distinctive features of a foreign payment: method, size, purpose 
and risk.86 If each factor were to be the-subject of an individual rule, 
inadvertent loopholes would undoubtedly permit circumvention of the 
disclosure obligations in situations in which payments would be plainly 
material under current practice. On the other hand, if a rule re-
quired that all factors be considered together, the materiality of 
expenditures of equal size would depend on whether they were in-
cluded in the normal accounting process, whether they were approved 
or ordered by top management, whether they were connected with 
future business as opposed to routine service functions, and whether 
the company would suffer financially if officials of the host country 
discovered the payments. 87 A realistic disclosure system for foreign 
payments would have to take this interplay of factors into account; 
this may be even more difficult to apply than the currently used ad 
hoc approach to materiality. 
It would seem that the difficulties inherent in establishing bright-
line rules could be avoided by requiring the disclosure of any improper 
foreign payment. The adoption of this materiality per se policy, 
however, would necessitate the promulgation of a clear and explicit 
definition of the word "improper." Yet this might again confront the 
Commission with the intractable problem of trying to encompass 
concepts of both lawfulness and ethics in its definition. A decision to 
focus exclusively on legislatively established norms of lawful conduct 
would simplify the task considerably. Thus, the per se rule could 
require disclosure of conduct that would have been unlawful had it 
taken place in the United States. Alternatively, or in addition, con-
duct that was unlawful in the country where it occurred could be 
deemed "improper" and disclosure made mandatory. A possible 
model for this type of provision is the section of the Internal Revenue 
Code that denies business expense deductions for certain foreign 
expenditures. 88 
85. See generally Garrett, supra note 8, at 30 ("We can attempt to set guidelines, 
but in the end I suspect we will all be less than satisfied with the product of our 
efforts, unless they are predicated upon actual business experience after consultation 
with those that have that experience"). 
86. These four factors were noted by former Commissioner Garrett, but were not 
necessarily intended by him to suggest definite rules. See Garrett, supra note 8, at 21. 
81. See Garrett, supra note 8, at 21-26. 
88. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 162(c). This section states in part: "No deduc-
tion shall be allowed • • . for any payment made • . . to an official or employee of 
any government . . • if the payment constitutes an illegal bribe or kickback or, if 
the payment is to an official or employee of a foreign government, the payment 
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Such a per se approach is not free of difficulties. Whether 
conduct is unlawful under either domestic or foreign law is often not 
immediately obvious; the determination will require individual adjudi-
cation in many cases. The uncertainty as to what constitutes illegality 
may, in fact, create a situation distressingly similar to the present one, 
in which companies faced with disclosure obligations that are deter-
mined on an ad hoc basis in the absence of specific guidelines 
normally make a reasonable, good faith choice of nondisclosure. 80 
The materiality per se approach can encourage disclosure, however, 
to the extent that corporate managers knowingly involved in unlawful 
activities will now be put on notice that such conduct is necessarily 
material. 00 
The materiality per se approach might, moreover, be limited to 
disclosure only of indictments or convictions of corporate officers and 
directors relating to improper foreign payments, in a fashion analo-
gous to that currently employed with respect to illegal corporate 
campaign contributions.91 This would not involve any interpretation 
by either the SEC or the regulated corporations, nor would it require 
a distinction between legal and ethical concepts. The price for this 
administrative convenience, however, is that it allows companies that 
escape prosecution also to avoid disclosure obligations.02 Further, 
the disclosure will be primarily of historical interest, since it will occur 
long after the information would have been most useful to investors 
and probably after any sanctions on the company have been imposed 
by the host country. As such it will have little informational or 
deterrent value03 and therefore is not a viable alternative. 
Arguably, the ambiguity in disclosure obligations would be re-
solved by completely omitting the concept of lawfulness and by 
requiring companies to report all fees or commissions above a speci-
fied amount having any connection with a foreign business transac-
tion. 94 This, however, presents two distinct problems. First, if the 
would be unlawful under the laws of the United States if such laws were applicable 
to such payment and to such official or employee." 
89. See generally notes 68-72 supra and accompanying text. 
90. Good faith compliance with a definitive disclosure requirement does not mean 
that the unlawful conduct will be stopped. See Wall St. J., March 3, 1976, at 3, cols. 
1-3 (midwest ed.). 
91. See text at note 60 supra. 
92. Foreign bribery and payoffs are apparently a common practice among corpo-
rations. See note 7 supra and accompanying text. Increasingly, companies are com-
ing forward with disclosure of such conduct. Wall St. J., March 16, 1976, at 28, 
col. 4 (midwest ed.). In spite of these revelations, very few prosecutions have been 
initiated. 
93. It is possible that the recent extensive media exposure has a greater impact 
than limited circulation SEC reports. 
94. A proposed bill would establish such a threshold amount. S. 3133, 94th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) reads in part: 
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threshold amount were a relatively low figure, for instance 1000 
dollars as lias been recently proposed, 95 the SEC and investors would 
be innundated with pages of useless information concerning trivial 
transactions. 96 It may be that 
theoretically, the objective of full disclosure would best be served 
by having (1) as many issuers as possible (2) disclose as many 
facts as possible (3) as completely as possible ( 4) on a fully cur-
rent basis (5) with perfect accuracy and objectivity (6) in such 
form as to be most readable and accessible by all interested in-
vestors. 97 
Practically, however, reporting the daily routine of activities in order 
to ensure disclosure of any improper transactions will simply flood the 
system with so much information that any value to the average 
investor would be substantially diluted.98 
The second problem with the specified monetary-limit approach 
is that it will be difficult to interpret and enforce. Are all amounts 
spent, such as payments for meals and taxis, to be aggregated in 
determining whether disclosure is required? If disclosure is required, 
should individual items be listed? Should the term "transaction" be 
broadly or narrowly construed? Can realistic valuations of payments 
be made when there is a transfer of tangible objects, such as paintings 
or consumer goods,99 rather than of cash? An attempt to resolve 
these questions with certainty would create the same dispute as to 
over- and under-inclusiveness that led to rejection of bright-line 
rules.100 
Sec. 2. Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act is amended by adding at 
the end thereof the following new subsection: 
(g) Each issuer of a security registered pursuant to section 12 shall file with 
the Commission periodic reports relating to any payment of money or furnishing 
of anything of value in an amount in excess of $1,000 paid or furnished 
or agreed to be paid or furnished by the issuer during the period covered by the 
report (i) to any person or entity employed by, affiliated with, or representing 
directly or indirectly, a foreign government or instrumentality thereof; (ii) to 
any foreign political party or candidate for foreign political office; or (iii) to 
any person retained to advise or represent the issuer in connection with obtain-
ing or maintaining business with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof 
or with influencing the legislation_or regulations of a foreign government. 
95. S. 3133, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(g) (1976). 
96. See Wall St. J., May 19, 1976, at 2, col. 3 (midwest ed.) ("The SEC chair-
man [said] a requirement to disclose payments in excess of $1000 would put 'a 
burden on the commission' and 'on the disclosure documents' that registered corpora-
tions must file"). 
97. Cohen, supra note 22, at 1367. 
98. See Garrett, supra note 8, at 20 ("If our processes should become so encum-
bered, we very much fear that they will become less effective for [investor protec-
tion]"). 
99. Reported transactions have included the offer of sporting goods to a purchas-
ing agent in order to make a sale and the gift of an expensive painting from an 
office wall. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 7, at 52. 
100. See text at notes 81-87 supra. 
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This analysis of the bright-line and materiality per se alternatives 
has demonstrated the impracticality of designing definitive regula-
tions that would ensure disclosure by good faith registrants. Reluc-
tance to formulate rigid rules governing the materiality of improper 
foreign payments is reinforced by a review of the possible conse-
quences of a finding that disclosure had been required in a particular 
case. Thus, if information is material it must be disclosed.101 If the 
disclosure is inaccurate or if part is omitted so that statements made 
are misleading, certain liabilities may be imposed upon the party 
required to disclose.102 If the disclosure or omission is in a registra-
tion statement for a public offering, the defendant may be liable for 
damages to every buyer.103 There is no reliance requirement104 and 
no defense allowed the issuer other than that the plaintiff actually 
knew the truth.105 
It is less clear what damages are available if the misleading 
statement or omission is not made in a registration statement, but 
rather, in an annual report106 or a press release.107 Very few cases 
under rule 1 0b-5108 ever reach a judgment on the merits, 100 and 
settlements, even when published, 110 do not provide legal authority. 
It is certain, however, that damages can be very high111 and could 
result in immediate bankruptcy of even the largest companies.112 
101. See text at note 45 supra. 
102. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 § 10b, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970). While section 10b refers 
to unlawfulness, civil liabilities can result from a violation. Pratt v. Robinson, 203 
F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953). 
103. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1970); Feit v. Leasco 
Data Processing Equip. Corp.; 332 F. Supp. 544, 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); R. JENNINGS 
& H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1026 (3d ed. 1972). 
104. "The plaintiff normally need not show any reliance upon the false statement 
in an action under Section 11; although the defendant may establish a defense by 
proving that the plaintiff at the time of his acquisition of the security 'knew of such 
untruth or omission.' " R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 103, at 1026. 
105. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575 
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). 
106. See Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 
903 (1969) (dictum) (damages available for misleading statements in an annual re-
port). 
101. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (damages 
available for misleading statements in a press release). 
108. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1975). 
109. See Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule lOb-5 Cases Involving Actively 
Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REV. 371 (1974). 
110. See, e.g., Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 55 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972). 
111. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 n.13 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). 
112. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 105 n.13 (10th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971). 
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The consequences of a materiality determination are thus poten-
tially quite serious. In the direct privity situation, in which the buyer 
fails to disclose to the seller information of basic importance or 
otherwise misleads him, it seems entirely proper that the seller have 
full recovery.U3 But that is a far cry from holding the buyer of one 
hundred shares on the New York Stock Exchange liable to every 
seller during the period a misleading statement or omission was 
operative.114 Specifically, consider the situation where a company's 
annual report fails to disclose that improper payments are being made 
in connection with the acquisition of foreign contracts. Suppose the 
payments are not of a character or amount that would be material 
under traditional standards based on financial significance. It is 
submitted that liability to every holder or purchaser for the decline in 
value of the corporation's stock during the period of nondisclosure 
would be an absurdity. However morally objectionable the conduct, 
a civil penalty of such magnitude without substantial proof that the 
specific actions caused the loss is blatantly unfair and can only be 
described as draconian.115 It is certainly arguable that the materiality 
question, whether the information might be important to the average 
investor, should be analyzed separately from the issue of appropriate 
damages. The wrong and the remedy must ultimately be harmoni-
ous, however, if respect for the legal system is to be maintained. This 
is a principle from which the SEC and the courts have only rarely 
departed. 
Even if ,these pragmatic problems of uncertain standards and 
potentially disproportionate sanctions could be avoided or minimized, 
the actual deterrence produced by any disclosure system may be 
insufficient to cause termination of the undesirable corporate con-
duct.116 Disclosure of particular activities does not automatically 
invoke direct condemnation and expressions of corporate blamewor-
thiness.117 This is illustrated by the SEC reaction to disclosures by 
Rollins, Inc. that it had made and would continue to make payoffs to 
local government officials in Mexico in connection with its outdoor 
113. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 155-56 (1972). 
114. For a discussion of the implications of Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 
446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), see R. JENNINGS & H. 
MARSH, supra note 103, at 1178. 
115. Manor Drug Stores v. Blue Chip Stamps, 492 F.2d 136, 147 (9th Cir. 1973) 
(dissenting opinion), revd., 421 U.S. 723 (1975). 
116. While the preceding discussion suggests that, at least theoretically, the dam-
ages for misleading statements or omissions can be astronomical, the seeming unreal-
ity of such an eventuality may lessen the deterrence stemming from those potential 
liabilities. 
117. SEC Chairman Roderick M. Hills said, "U.S. companies can continue· 
making payments 'extorted' by foreign tax, customs and other officials as the price 
of doing business overseas." Wall St. J., April 21, 1976, at 3, col. 1 (midwest ed.). 
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advertising business.118 The company claimed that such payments 
were "customary" in Mexico, a view disputed by a State Department 
official, and that they would be authorized in the future "where no 
reasonable alternative is available."119 This brought no objections 
from the SEC.120 
The disclosure obligation under these circumstances thus amounts 
to little more than a tariff on business operations in the foreign 
country. There may be a basic loss in favorable public relations for 
the company.121 More direct122 consequential costs could include 
civil and criminal prosecutions under the tax laws, 123 loss of signifi-
cant amounts of potential future business, 124 law suits seeking con-
tract damages, 125 removal of responsible corporate officers, 126 crimi-
nal prosecutions in the foreign countries involved, 127 shareholder suits 
against directors responsible for the payments, 128 expropriation or 
nationalization of corporate assets located in the foreign countries, 120 
and, perhaps most damaging, liability under the securities laws for 
omission or misrepresentation of material facts in any disclosure 
document.130 These costs could obviously vary widely in any given 
case; public disclosure will be an effective deterrent only if the 
anticipated costs of disclosure exceed the anticipated benefits. Since 
the gains are immediate and tangible whereas the costs are speculative 
and prospective, the financial balance weighs in favor of continuing 
improper payments.131 Disclosure will not adequately police corpo-
118. Wall St. J., March 3, 1976, at 3, cols. 2-4 (midwest ed.). 
119. Id. at 3, col. 2-3. 
120. Rollins, Inc. fully complied with all United States laws. "Under U.S. law, 
the payments made aren't illegal, and the company said it didn't deduct the $127,000 
for corporate income tax purposes. Nor did the money come from any slush fund 
or other secret account outside normal channels of corporation accountability . • . ." 
Id. Three other companies have similarly indicated that they may continue to make 
such payments. See SEC Report on Questionable Practices, supra note 21, at 46-
47. 
121. Many investors may believe that there are limits to the means that should 
be employed by management in pursuit of profits, but undoubtedly some feel that a 
well-placed bribe leading to increased profits is a mark of good management. 
122. Indirect costs would include such things as legal fees and lost productive 
time for top management officials. 
123. Wall St. J., July 18, 1975, at 4, col. 1 (midwest ed.). See also SEC Report 
on. Questionable Practices, supra note 21, at 40-41. 
124. Detroit News, Feb. 15, 1976, at lA, cols. 2-3, and at 14A, cols. 3-5. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. See also Wall St. J., Jan. 15, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (midwest ed.). 
127. Wall St. J., Feb. 18, 1976, at 4, cols. 2-3 (midwest ed.). 
128. Id. 
129. Wall St. J., May 15, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (midwest ed.), 
130. See text at notes 101-15 supra. 
131. See text at notes 117-20 supra. The Rollins Corporation is unwilling to 
cease paying bribes in light of the profits that are conditioned upon such payments. 
See generally Wall St. J., March 3, 1976, at 3, cols. 2-4 (midwest ed.), 
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rate conduct abroad because its effectiveness depends entirely on the 
vagaries of business profitability. 
If the public and its representatives believe that payments made 
abroad are unethical and should be terminated rather than merely 
disclosed, direct civil or criminal sanctions are appropriate. A Senate 
resolution requiring the executive branch to work toward development 
of an international code of corporate conduct in future trade negotia-
tions132 is a step in this direction, but it did not specify sanctions for a 
company's failure to comply and therefore contemplates an insuffi-
cient deterrent. Senator William Proxmire has taken the next step 
and proposed legislation that would make it a crime for United States 
corp_orations to use bribery in foreign transactions.133 Such direct 
sanctions have a distinct advantage over the disclosure approach. 
Civil or criminal penalties for violation of the laws could be set to 
impose the maximum deterrent effect commensurate with the gravity 
of the offense involved. The judiciary would have the authority to 
adjust the penalty in light of the particular circumstances, to guard 
against the kind of arbitrariness inherent in the disclosure system.134 
Decisions concerning what conduct is to be proscribed and what 
sanctions are appropriate will, of course, be as difficult as the analo-
gous decisions concerning disclosure obligations. The former, how-
ever, will be made in the context of traditional approaches to harmful 
conduct, will be accompanied by the safeguards for defendants asso-
ciated with any criminal proceeding,135 and will be made by the 
people's representatives in Congress rather than by the more narrowly 
constituted SEC. 
These qualitative differences between direct and indirect controls 
on improper corporate conduct are persuasive evidence for the desir-
ability of maintaining the separation of punitive and regulatory 
laws.136 The criticism of securities laws that are now over four 
decades old137 can only increase in volume and scope if the deterrence 
of unethical conduct is expressly added to existing goals. The dis-
closure system may already not be performing adequately the limited 
task of providing investor information;138 it is certainly ill-equipped 
132. S. Res. 265, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REc. 16735-36 (1975). 
133. Baltimore Evening Sun, March 12, 1976, at 1, cols. 2-3. See also S. 3133, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 
134. See text at notes 121-31 supra. 
135. If civil rather than criminal sanctions are imposed, the procedural safe-
guards, such as the burden of proof, would not be as rigorous. 
136. This conclusion would seem to apply to the situation in which the securities 
laws are currently being employed in the area of illegal campaign contributions. See 
text at notes 60-61 supra. 
137. For a recent criticism of the effectiveness of the SEC disclosure system as 
a tool for economic valuation, see Kripke, A Search for a Meaningful Securities Dis-
closure Policy, 31 Bus. LAW. 293 (1975). 
138. Id. 
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to take 'On additional burdens.139 Perhaps more fundamentally, the 
hard question of whether society in fact considers corporate payments 
abroad inimical and demands their cessation should not, and in the 
long run cannot, be avoided so easily. 
139. See Garrett, supra note 8, at 20. 
